Winter war in Ukraine: How the battle will change and what to expect by spring
Everything now depends on availability of resources: another wave of Russian conscripts to the front, the training of Ukrainian reserves, and supply of western weapons, experts say.
By Pavel Aksenov
It’s harder to fight in winter than in the summer, and the Russian army and the Ukrainian Armed Forces are struggling. Both sides are already facing new problems with low temperatures, grounded aircraft, snowfall, and other factors of the winter season. Will Russia or Ukraine be able to advance – or will the invaders build up their troops for a spring attack instead?
The nature of the winter combat will also hinge on other factors – Russia’s mobilisation, which began in September, and the release of troops from territory near Kherson, where the frontline has hit a natural barrier, the wide Dnipro river.
The lull at the front may be due to the autumn mudslides, and the fact that the two armies have yet to fully regroup after the liberation of Kherson. But what will happen once the reserves are in place and the ground freezes over? And crucially, what should we expect in the spring?
Ukrainian winter
Although Ukraine generally has a temperate climate, winter can bring heavy frosts and snow, especially in the east and north-east of the country. We examined the statistics for three regions which appeared in military reports over the past few weeks – Kharkiv, Donetsk, and Kherson.
According to Ukrainian meteorological service ‘Meteopost,’ the average temperatures in these three regions in December, January, and February will be below zero.
This means that the average minimum temperature – how cold it gets on the frostiest days or at it night – will be fairly low.
The depth of snow-cover in different areas along the front line can vary sharply from year to year. Some winters there is no snow at all.
Former Ukrainian volunteer Alexander Karpiuk, now serving in the marines, told the BBC that there is no typical theatre of operations in Ukraine from a geographic and climatic perspective.
“The south is like a billiard table. No hills at all. It’s all flat fields from Mikolaiv to Kherson. Absolutely nowhere to shelter, scarcely anything planted.”
“Luhansk region is a different story – in Soledar, and where the battle sites are there are hills, ravines, rivers and gullies,” while in “the built-up area around Donetsk, there’s generally fields, steppe and destroyed villages,” he said.
“In Mariupol and Donetsk you’re up against the sea and the humidity. And Donetsk is windy, there’s a terrible winter wind,” he explained.
According to long-term forecasts, the winter of 2022-2023 will be warmer than usual.
‘Severe Weather Europe’ website forecast that snow-cover across Europe will be lighter than usual, but in many regions – including southern Kherson – snow will follow the usual pattern, and will only be marginally slighter in Donetsk and Kharkiv.
In general, one wouldn’t describe winter in eastern Ukraine as snowy – but the further north you go, the more snow you get.
“General Frost”
The failures of winter military campaigns are often explained away by the argument that one army was more resilient to the cold than the other.
Many historians suggest that during Napoleon’s 1812 campaign in Russia and the battle for Moscow in 1941, one side was fighting under their usual winter conditions, whilst the other was encountering them for the first time. Yet this hypothesis is flawed – ‘General Frost’ is nobody’s ally in battle; he is equally dangerous to all.
It’s often thought that the Red army or the Imperial Russian army tended to win their winter battles, because they were more accustomed to fighting in the severe cold. But when the USSR invaded Finland in 1939, it became clear that Soviet soldiers could also lose due to bad weather and climate.
Nonetheless, whether or not a certain army can handle the cold is less important – it’s more a question of supply of equipment and training.
Although the Soviet army struggled against Finland, in the winter of 1941 they mounted a successful counteroffensive, surrounding Moscow. But after retreating from Moscow and surviving the Stalingrad winter of 1942-1943, German troops were still able to organise a winter attack in the Ardennes in December 1944.
In 1993, the engineers’ corps of the US army brought out a book, detailing the conduct of combat operations by ground forces under winter conditions. Its author, George Svintsov, a native Russian, was interned in Germany during the Second World War before moving to America.
One of the handbook’s key ideas is that appropriate tactical training and proper use of winter equipment is more important than familiarity with certain climatic conditions – whether they be tropical forest, desert, or winter steppe.
Survival skills
The main distinguishing feature of winter wars is that soldiers on the front must not only master particular tactical skills, but also the ability to withstand very low temperatures.
The same rules apply for weapons, clothes, equipment, technology, and everything that matters in combat – it all has to fit the season. Frost, snow and wind can be as deadly as a bullet or shrapnel.
Sometimes completely unexpected things become pivotal, like water. Dehydration can be much more dangerous in cold weather than in heat, as the thirst is not felt and body rapidly loses moisture.
Snow cannot fully replace water and delivering it to the frontline can be even more important in winter than in summer.
Alexander Karpiuk of the Ukrainian Armed Forces said his troops have enough experienced veterans whohave spent more than one winter at a frontline.
“There wasn’t a special program to train soldiers for winter. They’ve just picked up an understanding of how to fight in those conditions,” he said.
Many of them had experience in fighting in Donbass, while others spent several years without electricity in the Mariupol region, he said.
“These people know exactly how to dig trenches in winter, how to crawl without leaving tracks in the snow,” Karpiuk said.
“We’ve survived many winters on the front, huddled round wood-burners and generators.”
Keeping warm
Uniforms play an important role in the supply chain and it’s both quality and quantity that matter.
Low temperatures can be a cause of death for wounded soldiers – a few hours lying motionless on the ground could prove fatal. In winter, frontline soldiers are inundated with chemical hot-water bottles, stoves, generators, special lubricant for weapons, chains for tyres, and much more. Everything has to be delivered.
In bad weather, soldiers need more clothes, blankets, sleeping bags and tents. Out in the field, the army quickly burns through their supply, and relies on such things more heavily than in summer.
Clothes rip or wear out in the trenches, and are easily lost. In the summer it’s less of a problem to run out of dry socks. This doesn’t impact combat capability – but in the winter, wet feet can lead to severe frostbite.
Alexander Karpiuk, Ukrainian marine, said wind and moisture could also be a threat, warning that “the most unpleasant temperature to be around zero.”
“The melting snow spreads and flows into the trenches. Everything turns to mud. It’s impossible to walk normally on the farmland, and the damp gets into everything,” he said.
A soldier who fought in one of the units of the self-styled Donetsk People’s Republic in 2015-2016, told the BBC that the DPR units have an acceptable supply of winter equipment, according to his sources.
“If you’ve got a good uniform and equipment, then screw the snow and ice,” said the soldier who asked to remain anonymous for security reasons.
However, judging by multiple videos recorded by the soldiers themselves or their relatives, the mobilised soldiers with whom Russia is trying to cover the shortfall on the frontline are now having to buy clothes and even protective equipment at their own expense.
There may be some amongst them who know which kinds of boots, trousers and jackets will best conserve heat and withstand water, but many might end up purchasing things that would be fine for a walk in the park, but useless in a trench.
Karpiuk claims the Ukrainian army is better prepared for winter than the Russian army.
In the early days of fighting last winter, Ukrainian troops “were also very badly equipped.”
“We conscripted bums who had no idea whether they were civilians or soldiers.”
Now, Western allies supply Ukraine with lots of uniforms, warm clothes and other winter equipment since early autumn.
But the main difference is people’s support, which Russian do not have, he insisted.
“If the army needs something, people will bring it. There’s no generator – a volunteer will deliver one. The state supply isn’t the only way to cover winter needs.”
The supply chain
In winter, sending supplies becomes a much more difficult task. Although the frozen ground is much easier to travel over than the autumn mud or spring thaw, even a light layer of fallen snow greatly impedes the ability to move over rough terrain. The saying ‘war is waged along the roads’ becomes particularly apt in winter.
Snowfall and black ice require extra work to ensure roads are usable.
When trucks break down in summer, minor repairs can be carried out by the side of the road. It’s much harder to do this in icy temperatures.
Any breakdown is a problem for those who have to evacuate the vehicle and repair faulty or damaged equipment – but also for suppliers who have to deliver spare parts to frontline workshops.
The batteries problem
Sub-zero temperatures can have a detrimental effect on electrical systems, being used more and more by armies. Firstly, cold affects batteries, which are used everywhere – in radio stations, and ‘quadcopters’ [a kind of drone.] Communication and aerial reconnaissance by drones is one of the most important elements of modern warfare.
Andrei Morozov, a Russian war blogger fighting in one of the units of the self-styled Luhansk People’s Republic, writes that the main problem with quadcopters is the lithium batteries, which lose their charge much faster in the cold. This affects surveillance drones and aerial transponders.
Morozov wrote that the soldiers in the LPR even tried using kites to relay radio signals. One of the main mid-size drones in the Russian army ‘Orlan 10’ uses a petrol engine which isn’t affected by the cold. However, due to the difficulty of manufacturing smaller internal combustion engines, many Russian drones like the ‘Lancet’ loitering munition use electronic motors, which are less effective under low temperatures.
Winter war tactics
It’s harder to use aviation in the winter because no-fly conditions arise more frequently than in summer. But winter also provides certain opportunities for those prepared to use them.
Although electric-powered quadcopters are difficult to fly in the cold, the efficiency of air-surveillance goes up in winter. In summer, the leaves on the trees hide everything beneath them. Winter snow, particularly light snow, can give away a position – or a shelter or warehouse – and footprints on the ground are clearly visible from the air.
“Tracks are a giveaway, but they can also be used for misdirection. All the old tricks used in World War Two should be included in training programs,” claims Svintsov’s book.
In winter, the author writes, it’s more effective to strike in small, well-prepared groups than in large ones.
Thus surveillance, communication and coordination with other detachments are important to them.
Karpiuk estimates that artillery is generally the most important in this war, as “a lot depends on the concentration of divisions with engineering machines and equipment.”
“Winter, summer, it doesn’t matter…60 to 70 percent of success factor for an offensive is artillery,” he tells the BBC.
Is a winter offensive possible?
Many believe that active hostilities die down in winter but as George Svintsov notes, since winter complicates the plans of both armies at the front, the more confident side, with better prepared troops – should take the advantage.
He estimated that the only productive approach is to act as flexibly as is possible, without risking the loss of territory.
Svintsov however warns that a winter offensive is only possible with a five-to-six-fold superiority in manpower. If no such advantage exists in the overall balance of forces in a large area, it must be created on a smaller scale.
The combat veteran from the DPR said that different units might have different attack capability in winter.
“This might vary a bit from unit to unit, and there may be some who find it harder. But in terms of the overall operation, I don’t think there’s much difference,” he said.
Karpiuk estimates that Ukrainian army has proved it is capable of advancing.
“Just a year ago, I would have told you a winter offensive was impossible. But at Lyman and Kharkiv, offensives were carried out by the book” he said.
Ukrainian troops “destroyed infrastructure, kept up the pressure in multiple directions, struck weak targets, and the defence collapsed.”
“This gives us hope that Ukraine can do this,” he said.
Could a new offensive begin?
The Ukrainian army has enough soldiers to resist the Russians, although after mobilisation began, Russia was able to send reinforcements to frontline units.
The haste of this act practically eliminated any tactical training of new soldiers, who often lacked warm clothes and protective equipment.
But Russia was still able to restock the frontline, consolidate their battle formations, and complicate the offensives of the Ukrainian army.
At the end of summer, Ukraine seized a strategic advantage. In autumn, the army conducted two major offensives: in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the east, and near Kherson in the south where, after a series of breakthroughs, the Russian consignment had to flee the right bank of the Dnipro.
In turn, the Russian army has for several months continued their onslaught in Donetsk.
Russia’s tactic was – and remains – to ‘gnaw’ through the carefully planned defences of Ukraine.
Now both sides have grounds to carry out offensive actions, experts noted.
Ukraine holds the advantage and cannot afford to lose it, while after a series of gruelling retreats, there is pressure on the Russian army to achieve some success, to compensate for the disappointment of the war.
It all depends on the reserves
Two factors have a great impact on the situation at the front – the release of combat-ready units from territory near Kherson, and the mobilisation.
After the Russian formation retreated to the left bank of the Dnipro, a wide river, tricky to cross, there was less of a need to maintain combat-ready units in this area.
Israeli military expert David Gendelman told the BBC that working out how quickly the units will be released and in which direction is the main question on the front.
He estimated that “in a strategic sense, the most attractive and tempting option for Ukraine would be an offensive from the direction of Zaporizhzhia to Melitopol, to cut the land corridor to Crimea.”
“If such an offensive were successful, it would seriously complicate the position of the Russian group in Crimea and on the left bank in Kherson region, primarily in terms of logistics," he said.
However, he noted that the Russian command was already transferring forces towards Zaporizhzhia, where new fortified lines of defence were being prepared.
Gendelman also notes that since active military operations are continuing in several directions,
The Ukrainian army will need to send some of its troops towards the Russian advance as military operations are active in several directions, to slow the march of the Russian army towards Bakhmut and Vuhledar, he notes.
"Depending on the balance of the respective forces in the direction they take, there are chances for successful Ukrainian offensives,” he estimated.
But Gendelman warned that “it would be desirable to receive several hundred more armoured vehicles and artillery units.”
For the Russia’s position, a “large-scale offensive that seizes the advantage still looks rather unlikely.”
“It’s more probable that we’ll see further gradual ‘gnawing,’ as in Bakhmut and Vuhledar," said Gendelman.
Everything now depends on the receiving of resources: another wave of Russian conscripts to the front, the training of Ukrainian reserves, supply of western weapons, he estimates.
Three scenarios
This war has already seen events radically alter their course more than once. According to the Economist, there are three scenarios for the war in Ukraine in the coming year.
The first scenario foresees that the frontline stabilises over the winter, whilst Russia gathers reserves and prepares for a spring offensive. The flow of US aid to Ukraine is blocked by Republicans in Congress, European aid fizzles out, and Ukraine – having lost Kryvyi Rih, Sloviansk, and Kramatorsk, agrees to a truce. Russia spends this time rearming and preparing for a new war.
The second scenario predicts a stalemate where neither side can achieve a conclusive victory. Mobilised Russians fill the trenches at the front, but can’t go on the offensive, whilst the Ukrainian army suffers too many losses. The war freezes for months, or even years.
The third scenario examines the possibility of a Ukrainian winter offensive, collapsing the Russian defence in Luhansk. In the spring, the Ukrainian army begins to move into Zaporizhzhia, surrounding Mariupol and heading for the Crimean border.
In each of these scenarios, both sides face risks. The first threatens to start a future bout of war in Ukraine, the second is more dangerous to Russia itself as society gradually loses support for the war. In the third scenario, the Economist fears Russia’s use of nuclear weapons.
Additional reporting by Vitalii Chervonenko and Olga Ivshina.
Read this story in Russian here.
Translated by Pippa Crawford.