US-Israel attack: Where are Iran's allies, Russia and China?
Traditionally seen as allies of Tehran, the way the two countries have responded might hint at the real nature of their relationship with Iran.
By Sergey Goryashko, BBC News Russian & Shawn Yuan, Global China Unit, BBC World Service.
With the UK allowing Washington to use its air bases for “defensive” strikes during the US-Israel war with Iran, attention has focused on what support Tehran might receive from abroad.
Russia and China both have strong diplomatic, trade and military links to the Islamic Republic, but the current conflict will bring into focus just how far they are willing to back it.
Loud but limited support from Russia
Moscow’s response to the joint US–Israeli strikes on Iran has been loud, but limited, signalling anger and solidarity with Tehran, while carefully avoiding steps that would draw Russia directly into the confrontation.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov spoke of the “deep disappointment” that, despite talks between Washington and Tehran, the situation had “degraded into outright aggression”.
Moscow, he said, was in constant contact with Iran’s leadership and with the Gulf states affected by the escalation.
The Russian foreign ministry has condemned what it called “unprovoked aggression” against Iran by the US and Israel and denounced what it views to be political assassinations and the “hunt” for leaders of sovereign states.
On Sunday, President Vladimir Putin sent condolences to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian over the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, calling it a “cynical violation of human morality and international law”.
Yet the Kremlin has notably avoided personal criticism of US President Donald Trump and is still expressing gratitude for American mediation efforts over Ukraine.
Russia is heavily engaged in Ukraine and appears unwilling – and perhaps unable – to offer more than diplomatic backing and military‑technical co-operation.
Asked on Monday how Moscow could now trust Washington, Peskov replied that Russia “first and foremost trusts only itself” and defends its own interests.
Those interests help explain why Russia’s support for Iran remains largely rhetorical even though Tehran has become one of Moscow’s closest allies since the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, supplying drones and helping Russia develop ways to evade Western sanctions.
Iran also fits the Kremlin’s vision of a multipolar order, in which state rights are more important than human rights, and governments exercise sweeping control at home. The fall of such a regime would be a blow to that model.
At the same time, the Kremlin has shown before that it will not risk too much for its partners, whether it be in Venezuela, in Syria or during the 12‑day war between Israel and Iran in the summer of 2025.
Russia is heavily engaged in Ukraine and appears unwilling – and perhaps unable – to offer more than diplomatic backing and military‑technical co-operation.
The Russian-Iranian strategic partnership treaty signed on 17 January 2025 stops short of being a mutual defence pact.
Moscow and Tehran pledged to share information, hold joint exercises and “ensure regional security”, but they did not promise to defend one another if attacked. Economic ties between the two countries are also modest, and trade remains in the $4bn–$5bn range.
But military and industrial links are growing. In February, the Financial Times newspaper reported a major deal under which Russia would supply Iran with Verba man-portable air defence systems worth €500m.
Iran has received Yak‑130 training aircraft, Mi‑28 attack helicopters and is expecting Su‑35 fighters, though Russia is yet to supply the Verba systems.
The use of Iranian-made Shahed drones significantly changed the tactics of Russian forces on the Ukrainian front. But last year, Moscow rapidly expanded its own drone production, reducing its dependence on Iranian weapons.
For Moscow, Iran is too important to be allowed to fall – but not important enough to fight for. That calculation could change, but for now Russia’s intervention is likely to remain largely confined to words.
China’s role as an economic lifeline
China has strongly condemned the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Beijing has historically opposed US strategies of regime change around the world.
At the heart of the China-Iran bond is a mutually beneficial economic partnership. China is Iran’s largest trading partner and its most important energy customer.
Despite years of punishing US sanctions on Iran, Beijing has remained Tehran’s economic lifeline, purchasing large quantities of its oil at a discounted prices through a network of so-called “ghost fleets” – falsely registered ships that avoid sanctions to transport oil.
A pro-Western regime in Tehran would be a catastrophic geopolitical defeat for China, as Tehran not only provides energy but also politically represents a sizeable counterweight to US influence in the region.
In 2025, for example, China bought more than 80% of Iran’s shipped oil, and the revenues earned from Chinese purchases have helped Iran stabilise its economy and fund defence spending even as Western markets closed off.
A 25-year strategic agreement signed in 2021 solidified the relationship, promising hundreds of billions in Chinese investment in Iranian infrastructure and telecommunications.
China’s ‘long game’
Historically, China’s approach to Iran-Israel and Iran-US tensions has been one of strategic hedging.
During previous escalations, including the 12-day Israel-Iran war in the summer of 2025, China consistently called for “restraint” while blaming “external interference” – a not-so-thinly veiled reference to US policy.
In previous clashes between Iran and Israel, China acted as a diplomatic shield for Tehran, using its veto power – or the threat of using it – to water down UN resolutions. However, China has never offered direct military intervention.
Beijing’s strategy has always been to keep the US bogged down in the Middle East without triggering a total regional collapse that would spike global oil prices.
A pro-Western regime in Tehran would be a catastrophic geopolitical defeat for China, as Tehran not only provides energy but also politically represents a sizeable counterweight to US influence in the region.
Iran is a member of Brics and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, and serves as a key geographical connector linking Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East.
A collapse of the Islamic Republic could weaken the credibility of the multilateral mechanisms that Moscow and Beijing have been trying to strengthen.
Without a full US-Israeli invasion of Iran, the political and military structures there may well remain.
Beijing will play its usual “long game”, intending to make good with whoever is going to take over Khamenei’s position as leader of Iran, while Russia will look for opportunities of its own.
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