No critics in wartime. The state of Ukrainian politics after half a year of war with Russia
Since the Russian invasion, power in Ukraine has been concentrated in the hands of president Zelensky. Could it signal a turn towards authoritarianism?
By Svyatoslav Khomenko
After six months of war in Ukraine, pro-Russian political parties have completely disappeared – and they do not seem likely to return. Power in the country has been concentrated in the hands of the Ukrainian president. And while this might make sense in times of war, many Ukrainians worry that it could signal a turn towards authoritarianism. But for now, the majority of Ukrainian citizens believe things are unfolding positively in the country, and have complete confidence in President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Ukrainian armed forces.
Just half a year ago, in the weeks and days preceding the full-scale Russian invasion, the political scene in Ukraine was multifarious. Political developments, as ever in the country, were impossible to predict.
Volodymyr Zelensky continued to lead in the presidential polls, but increasingly social research was showing that he would be defeated in a second round of voting by Petro Poroshenko, his predecessor. Evidently in an attempt to fortify itself against the growing popularity of the ex-president, the government opened criminal cases against Poroshenko and presented him with a summons for questioning when he was at the airport, preventing him from leaving the country.
Poroshenko was accused of treason. According to the criminal investigation, he was in league with Viktor Medvedchuk, leader of the pro-Russian ‘For Life’ party and godfather to Vladimir Putin’s younger daughter. Medvedchuk was then under house arrest. It was alleged they had been smuggling coal into Ukraine from the self-proclaimed ‘republics’ of the Donbas.
Political commentators at the time were talking about whether Dmitri Razumkov might become the ‘new Zelensky’. A former speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, the Ukrainian parliament, he is also leader of the newly-formed grouping ‘Reasonable Politics’. Razumkov in the past featured frequently as a guest of popular political talk shows on television channels belonging to Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine’s richest man. Then there was Sergei Pritula, a popular entertainer who has raised support and cash for Ukraine’s military, who was preparing to launch his own political party.
The constant flow of western intelligence reports that Russia was about to start a war against Ukraine was met with scepticism by most of the population. And in his January address to the people, Volodymyr Zelensky urged people not to panic or fear the outbreak of war, but to get their barbeques ready for the May holidays instead.
Reading over news reports from those days, they seem unbelievable – that’s how radically things have changed in Ukraine over the last six months.
“Disappearing differences”
Above all, the last six months or so have witnessed a widespread change in the political outlook in society: sociologists note the unprecedented solidarity of Ukrainians.
“Russia has done everything to ensure that Ukrainians unite in the face of annihilation”, Oleksiy Antipovich, head of the polling agency ‘Rating’, said in an interview with Radio NV.
“Distinctions are no longer made between east and west, between men and women, between the older and younger generations. In the biological sense, differences may be perceived between such groups – women are more likely to seek peace and safety whilst men are more ready to take up arms and go to fight. But in terms of ideological values in the public sphere there are no differences. In terms of attitudes towards the war, towards the government and the president, there are no differences”.
The numbers speak for themselves. Over 90 percent of Ukrainians – and these figures haven’t changed since the start of the conflict – are convinced that Ukraine can defeat Russia in the war. Over 70 percent - an unimaginable figure for pre-war Ukraine – consider events in their country to be heading in the right direction. All of this despite the daily bombardment of Ukrainian towns and worsening economic problems.
Of course, the figures may vary depending on the methodology of the study. However, the Ukrainian armed forces and President Volodymyr Zelensky consistently assume the two top spots when Ukrainians are asked which institutions they are most inclined to trust.
It is important to understand that public approval for Zelensky’s trustworthiness and his actions do not translate to political support or an electoral rating. All elections have been banned since the state of war was declared on February 24th, and polling services are no longer publishing the popularity ratings of politicians or of political parties.
“The one and only news”
Without doubt, the way Volodymyr Zelensky has conducted himself throughout the war has inspired respect even from his most steadfast political opponents. He refused to flee Kyiv in the early days of the war, despite offers from western nations. He personally visited Ukrainian troops under constant fire, and continues to spearhead Ukrainian resistance to the Russian occupation.
It is very unfashionable to criticise the president these days: to do so is practically like fraternising with the enemy, according to political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko.
However, those same opponents are eager to remind us that Zelensky’s speeches and the speeches of his closest allies can be heard just about everywhere in Ukraine.
In particular, on TV. In the first days of the war, Ukraine’s most significant media groups came together to create the ‘United News’ telethon. Practically all national television channels show the same telethon stream, for which they take turns creating segments of programming. The endless political talk shows, previously a staple of Ukrainian television, have all but gone off air. The coordination of the telethon is believed to lie with the minister of culture, Oleksandr Tkachenko, and the Office of the President.
Three channels that had been associated with Petro Poroshenko, and which had only partly transmitted the telethon, were simply deprived of their broadcasting rights by the Ukrainian regulator. Now they can only operate on the internet, or via cable networks. According to a well-informed source of the BBC, audiences are down to between a quarter and a third of pre-war figures.
“The government has confiscated broadcasting rights from public and private broadcasters and uses that time for its own purposes – for example for its own PR ,and for settling accounts with former political opponents,” says Otar Dovzhenko, a media expert in the organisation “Detector Media”.
“Furthermore, these productions and transmissions are paid for by the studios themselves, but they can’t get advertising revenue because ads are not played during the telethon.”
The official aim of the telethon is Ukrainian victory in the information war. However it is hard to say whether undisguised PR from the Office of the President, and content produced by the ‘Kvartal 95’ studio, where Zelensky worked before his election, are to the point here, Dovzhenko notes.
Each day, the president’s former colleagues at ‘Kvartal 95’ release a Ukrainian-language satirical bulletin ‘Bayraktar News’, named after the Turkish-made drone that has played such a high profile role in the war. The humour is low-brow and colloquial, as it used to be in pre-war, Russian-language ‘Kvartal’ productions.
For example, two actors discuss what questions could be in an updated Schengen visa questionnaire for Russians. Among the options: "Which country is the meanest in the world, and why is it Russia?" and "Why do you need to see Paris, if you can die near Chernobayevka? [scene of heavy Russian military casualties during the war]".
“[Minister of Culture of Ukraine Oleksandr] Tkachenko has repeated several times recently that the telethon will continue ‘until victory’. But frankly, I have little idea how the owners of TV channels, unlike the state, can have enough money and motivation to finance production of the telethon for another year or so,” says Otar Dovzhenko, adding that, according to the ‘1+1’ television channel, the cost of producing their telethon segment alone is around 20-25 million hryvnias a month – or well over half a million US dollars.
Experts link the exit of Rinat Akhmedov’s media holding from the Ukrainian market to a desire to cut funding for television channels that were not providing immediate political benefit.
Furthermore, it is possible that the government’s monopolisation of television has bolstered another trend: the large scale migration of Ukrainians to the internet as they seek news from alternative sources, such as Telegram and YouTube.
“The moderation centre”
But the fact that Ukrainians are looking elsewhere for their news does not mean they are ready to criticise the government. A large study by Kyiv’s International Institute of Sociology showed that 62 percent of Ukrainians believe that even constructive criticism of the actions of the government to be unacceptable in wartime. And 79 percent believe that during conflict, the president should be allowed to interfere in the work of parliament and the government in order to strengthen the country's defences.
These figures accurately reflect the reality in Ukraine. From the first days of war, power became centralised in Bankova Street, at the Office of the President. The Cabinet of Ministers is increasingly called in Kyiv a ‘technical appendage’ to the presidential administration, and the role of the Verkhovna Rada has been reduced to a minimum. Not least since its sessions, often used by politicians for banal self-PR in the pre-war period, are no longer broadcast on TV.
Within parliament itself, the president’s party, ‘Servant of the People’, technically holds a majority. In reality, it has to win over votes from formal opposition groups. But there’s no longer any blocking of speakers, or punch-ups in parliament.
Mykhailo Podolyak, an associate of Vladimir Zelensky and adviser to the head of the Office of the President, says these changes in the Ukrainian system of power are a direct consequence of the conflict:
“As soon as the war began, all governmental institutions became bogged down to some degree. And it was clear that a unified, mobilised and centralised executive was needed. So the president, from the very first days of the war, took on this role. He has also created a ‘Centre for Moderation’ based in the Office of the President, which has expanded to include the cabinet of ministers, parliament and regional elites,” he told the BBC.
“Therefore, all branches of government are now operating in lock step. This would not be normal in peacetime. However, right now it is optimal to have a ‘key manager’ who assumes responsibility for internal political functions as well as for matters of economy and war”.
The fact that the previously diverse Ukrainian opposition has simply disappeared from the media has also played into the hands of the government. Directly criticising the economic, political, and especially the miliitary decisions of the commander-in-chief in a country at war, who is trusted by 90 percent of Ukrainians, is like shooting oneself in the foot.
Even questions posed by the western press, for example whether the Kyiv government had adequately prepared Ukraine for a war they were warned about long before the invasion, are not raised. It’s something to discuss after the war, as it were.
Moreover, according to people the BBC has spoken with, the government refused help from former members of ‘the old opposition’ as a matter of principle.
According to information available to the BBC, high-ranking military officials from the time of former president Petro Poroshenko who were ready to share their experience were told that Ukrainian army had no need of their services.
An in-person meeting between Volodymyr Zelensky and Petro Poroshenko in the first days of the Russian invasion ended with a handshake and a truce. But the two parties soon returned to a state of ‘cold war’, deploying anonymous Telegram accounts and bots against one another. According to his staff, Poroshenko is now engaged in volunteer work, and lobbies for the interests of Ukraine with his old foreign contacts.
The travel restrictions imposed on Poroshenko last winter as a result of the case concerning the smuggling of Donbas coal have not been extended and he is now free to travel around Ukraine and abroad.
“I don’t understand their [Zelensky’s team’s] logic. They themselves force us into this ‘anti-Zelensky’ thing. Apart from Zelensky’s personal insecurities I have no other explanation for it,” says a member of Petro Poroshenko’s inner circle, who agreed to talk to the BBC on condition of anonymity.
Responding to a request to comment on the relationship between the current and former presidents of Ukraine, Mykhailo Podolyak responded: “I think it makes no sense to talk about Poroshenko. It is in the past”.
Looming authoritarianism?
And it might have rested there, were it not for the criticism of the presidential team that it is using its position of increased power – gained through the war – to greatly increase its already virtually unlimited influence, while at the same time reining in the political opposition.
The suppression of Petro Poroshenko’s TV channels was never clearly explained to the public. And some mayors, including Vitaliy Klitschko of Kyiv and Chernihiv mayor Vladislav Atroshenko, have been unable to travel abroad to seek funding to rebuild their cities. Both have claimed that it is because of their status as political independents: which is something that the President’s Office dislikes.
Finally, the Dnipro businessman and politician Gennady Korban, who previously criticized Zelensky, was simply refused entry into Ukraine and had his passport confiscated by border guards without explanation. The Ukrainian authorities still have not given reasons for the decision, though some media connect it with the possibility that Korban has a second, Israeli passport.
These facts are often used by Zelensky’s critics to suggest that the Ukrainian government’s crisis management during the war has slowly started to resemble authoritarianism.
“Certain authoritarian tendencies are inevitable in times of war”, says Oleksiy Garan, a political scientist and the scientific director of the ‘Democratic Initiatives Foundation’.
“But we must note these tendencies were observed in Zelensky as early as in 2019”.
Indeed, before the war the Ukrainian president often made unconventional political moves. For example, on the pretext of speeding up reforms, Zelensky dismissed the judges of the Constitutional Court, which was a dubious move from the point of view of the law.
Volodymyr Fesenko agrees that worrying tendencies emerge in democratic countries in times of war, citing the USA’s internment of Japanese during World War II. But he says one should not worry about the fate of democracy in Ukraine.
“It will be impossible to preserve the signs of authoritarianism after the war, even if someone were to have the desire to do so,” he says. “First, our society, having experienced 30 years of independence, has become accustomed to democracy. We will not accept authoritarianism: our political culture is semi-anarchic. Second, Ukraine has become a candidate country for EU membership, and we will simply have to play by democratic rules. Plus the United States and UK will be critical of any authoritarian tendencies".
Out with the prime minister?
Paradoxically, wartime and the curtailment of domestic political life in Ukraine have not led to the death of political debate - however, as those we have spoken to admit, it has been very much transformed.
For example, recently the Ukrainian media have been actively talking up the resignation of prime minister Denys Shmyhal.
“Shmyhal performs well, lacks any real political ambitions, and accepts it when the Office of the President invades his remit. On the one hand, this should make him very suitable as head of government”, says political analyst Volodymyr Fesenko.
On the other hand, he notes, in wartime conditions, the country’s governance system demands more initiative-taking. The Office of the President is so focused on issues of war and foreign policy, especially on acquiring western aid for the Ukrainian military, that many economic and domestic issues have been allowed to deteriorate. More was expected from the government to resolve them, Fesenko suggests.
For example, a few months ago Ukraine faced a fuel crisis. There was no petrol at the country’s pumps, but it was being sold at 20 litres per person at speculative, under-the-counter prices. According to many, the government was too slow in addressing the crisis. What would happen if this situation were to repeat itself in the winter months, which promise to be the toughest in the history of Ukraine?
Mykhailo Podolyak refers to rumours about an upcoming change of prime minister as pure speculation. “Commonly here, when people start to feel a little calmer, conspiracy theories start to pop up. They talk of early elections to parliament, or about a change in government. Even the war hasn’t changed this. There can be no elections as a result of the state of war, so therefore they say the government is ‘being changed’”.
But if there is no threat to the incumbent premier, how can one explain the activity in the media, instigated precisely by those politicians tipped to be potential successors to Shmyhal?
The deputy head of the Office of the President, Rostislav Shurma, presented a revolutionary reform of the tax system. Defence minister Oleksiy Reznikov wrote a policy article on how Ukraine should live according to the principle of ‘smart militarisation’. Infrastructure minister Alexander Kubrakov gave a keynote interview on the critical importance of the industry entrusted to him both in wartime and in peacetime. At a donor conference in Lugano, Switzerland, the deputy prime minister for digital transformation Mikhail Fyodorov presented the concept of a new Ukrainian government - greatly reduced, but much more effective.
Is this not a race for the prime minister's chair, which is at present wobbling beneath Shmyhal?
“If we have five candidates vying to become Prime Minister, let them compete between themselves, and see who is more adept at tackling macroeconomics. A bit of competition will push the current cabinet of ministers to work harder,” laughs Mykhailo Podolyak.
“Plus, if our teams are ready and have prepared their programmes then they must present them, otherwise how will we know that they exist? It’s a competition of ideas - why should that be seen as a bad thing?” he says, and repeats that, according to his information, Shmyhal's future as prime minister is not in danger at present.
The Zaluzhny Case
One further intrigue in Ukraine’s political life concerns the persistent rumours that Valery Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, is facing imminent dismissal. These rumours have been circulating in the Ukrainian media for the past few weeks, citing anonymous high-ranking sources in the government and in the army.
The reason for such a dismissal could be alleged sociological studies commissioned by the Office of the President which showed that Zaluzhny, as the personification of the armed forces, is the only individual on the political scene capable of challenging Volodymyr Zelensky in a hypothetical presidential election. Allegedly, this worries some members of the president’s team.
Those that subscribe to the theory reckon that the government could solve this problem by getting Zaluzhny to resign, and then ‘promoting’ him to the cabinet post of defence minister.
Though he has not given a single interview since the start of the war, Zaluzhny is constantly featured in western media and was even named as one of the most influential people of 2022 by Time Magazine.
Zaluzhny himself has never voiced political ambitions. But in April, many experts drew attention to the news that the general had created a fund in his own name – allegedly for the coordination of Ukrainian and International volunteers. Even then, the press was predicting that this fund could become the basis for Zaluzhny to create his own political movement in the future.
After a wave of criticism, the fund ‘We Will Win’ was created anyway, though Zaluzhny is not mentioned anywhere on its website. The foundation’s supervisory board is instead headed by the actress Ada Rogovtseva.
Mykhailo Podolyak says that none of the sociological studies cited by proponents of the theory of electoral jealousy between Zelensky and Zaluzhny have in fact taken place. Rumours of the possible resignation of the commander-in-chief are conspiracies of the same sort that characterised peacetime Ukrainian politics. He adds that the Russian secret service also became involved at some point in stirring things up around Zaluzhny:
“The Russians simply don’t understand our society. In the first days of the war, they operated clumsily, indiscriminately spreading messages along the lines of ‘Zelensky has fled to Timisoara or to Poland’ in social media channels. They saw that this only made us laugh and have begun to act more shrewdly, as in this case. Here, their psy-ops have assumed our political style - and this is very dangerous", he says.
A few days ago, the president personally denied there were any plans to transfer Zaluzhny to another post. The statement failed to convince Zelensky’s most stubborn sceptics. At the end of June, Zelensky had similarly stated that he was not going to dismiss his close associate, Ivan Bakanov, the head of the Ukrainian Security Service. The president signed a decree to fire him some three weeks later.
Without Russia
One more development in Ukrainian politics since the start of the war has been the disappearance of pro-Russian parties that campaigned for closer ties with Moscow or enhancing the status of the Russian language. The latest pre-war Kyiv International Institute of Sociology poll showed that only about 20 percent of Ukrainian voters were ready to vote for parties like Viktor Medvedchuk's ‘For Life’, Yevgeny Muraev’s ‘Our Party’ or Anatoliy Shariy’s ‘Party of Shariy’.
Soon after the start of the war, all of them along with comparable political actors were banned by the courts. Their electoral bases were then destroyed by the actions of the Russian army, as they bombed cities and villages in the south and east of Ukraine.
Sociologist Oleksiy Antipovich, in an interview with Radio NV, provides this example to illustrate the ideological shift in Ukrainian society: Stepan Bandera is now a hero for about 75 percent of the population of Ukraine. Importantly, the change did not occur in the west of the country, where the controversial figure of Bandera was relatively popular even before the war, but in the east, south and centre.
“Everything that concerns Russia is now toxic there. I think these changes are irreversible, given the physical and psychological losses that are now being suffered by Ukrainians", he says.
"After what the people of Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Odesa have gone through, any attempt to talk about friendship with Russia will result in a harsh and aggressive response,” says analyst Volodymyr Fesenko, himself a native of Kharkiv region.
“The theme of friendship with Russia will disappear from our politics. Even the theme of peace and reconciliation, in the face of ongoing aggression will be perceived as a betrayal."
The same applies to the language issue, which, because of the war, is very likely to at last lose its status as one of the most polarising questions in Ukrainian society. If ten years ago the number of Ukrainians who spoke exclusively Russian in everyday life had reached 40 percent, polls now indicate that this number has decreased to 13 percent.
86 percent of Ukrainians are now in favour of Ukrainian being the only state language in their country.
"I'm more than certain that any politician (offering other options for resolving the language issue) will simply be beaten with sticks," Antipovich jokes.
Read this story in Russian here.
Translated by Danny Booth.